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Abstract
Concern that donations to political campaigns secure preferential treatment 
from policymakers has long occupied judges, scholars, and the public. 
However, the effects of contributions on policymakers’ behavior are 
notoriously difficult to assess. We present the first randomized field 
experiment on the topic. The experiment focuses on whether contributions 
facilitate access to influential policymakers. In the experiment, a political 
organization attempted to schedule meetings between 191 Congressional 
offices and the organization’s members in their districts who were campaign 
donors. However, the organization randomly assigned whether it revealed to 
Congressional offices that prospective attendees had contributed to 
campaigns. When informed prospective attendees were political donors, 
senior policymakers made themselves available between three and four 
times more often. These findings underscore concerns about the Supreme 
** Replication data and code are available at the AJPS Data Archive on Dataverse 
(http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/ajps). We thank Chris Cotton, Bo Cowgill, Alan Gerber, Don
Green, Jacob Hacker, Greg Huber, Gabe Lenz, Eric Schickler, Rob Van Houweling, the three 
anonymous referees, and seminar participants at Yale and Berkeley for helpful feedback. All 
remaining errors are our own. David Broockman acknowledges the National Science 
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Court’s recent decisions deregulating campaign finance.
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Congressional campaigns spent $3.7 billion in the 2012 election cycle 
(Center for Responsive Politics 2013) and, as Lewis et al. (1998) wryly note, 
such sums are not raised at bake sales. Rather, the lion’s share of funds 
spent to support and oppose candidates for office comes from the wealthy 
and from interest groups, who typically have different preferences and 
priorities than most Americans (e.g., Bawn et al. 2012; Page et al. 2013). 
Concerning many, the role of these organized interests and wealthy donors 
in American elections has continued to grow in the wake of the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Citizens United, which allowed independent groups to 
spend unlimited sums influencing elections. Such groups spent over $1 
billion in 2012, a more than doubling since 2008 (Center for Responsive 
Politics 2014).
The potential that contributions to such efforts facilitate access to 
influential policymakers has long garnered special concern. Such concerns 
arise for at least two reasons. First, access to powerful officials is often 
necessary for influencing policy, even if it is not sufficient (Hansen 1991). In 
order to make one’s case to a policymaker, one typically needs to secure her
attention first (Lewis et al. 1998; Hasen 2012; Wright 1990; Hall and 
Wayman 1990). Second, when senior policymakers grant access, they 
expend a scarce legislative resource. Policymakers’ time is finite, so when 
they decide to spend time hearing the concerns of some individuals, they 
have less time to hear others’ (Hall 1996; Hall and Deardorff 2006). A chief 
concern voiced by critics of the American system of campaign finance has 
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thus been that it encourages legislators to spend time attending to the 
concerns of donors and groups who represent their interests, giving those 
who can afford to contribute an advantage in the policy process (e.g., Barber
2014; Fouirnaies and Hall 2014a, b; Hall and Wayman 1990; Hall and 
Deardorff 2006; Lessig 2011; Miler 2009, 2010; Page et al. 2013; Powell 
2012, 2013).
To many casual observers and the public at large, it seems obvious 
that contributions facilitate this sort of special treatment (Lessig 2011; Gilens
2012). Indeed, the overwhelming majority of Americans who disapprove of 
Congress name “corruption” of the political process by campaign 
contributions as their main grievance (Grimmer and Powell 2013). Political 
actors themselves also appear to believe contributions facilitate access to 
senior policymakers. For example, Fouirnaies and Hall (2014b) find that firms
with higher exposure to regulation give more to incumbents, consistent with 
the belief that their contributions facilitate access. Likewise, when legislators
lose committee seats, companies that these legislators’ former committees 
regulate tend to decrease their contributions to them, suggestive of a spot 
market for access (Grimmer and Powell 2013). Groups also tend to give more
to legislators who occupy powerful positions within legislatures, further 
consistent with the notion that contributors see special value in gaining 
access to powerful decision-makers (Powell 2012; Fouirnaies and Hall 
2014c).
Evidence that the public, donors, and organized interests believe 
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contributions facilitate access to policymakers has continued to build, yet 
evidence establishing the causal link between contributions and 
policymakers’ actual behavior has been less forthcoming. Indeed, one of the 
few points of agreement in the literature on campaign finance is that the 
available evidence is insufficient for assessing the causal impacts of 
contributions, both in general (e.g., Baumgartner et al. 2009; Fox and 
Rothenberg 2011) and with regards to access decisions specifically 
(Langbein 1986; Austen-Smith 1995). The concern is endogeneity. For 
example, correlations between money and access may be spurious, simply 
reflecting shared ideology. If legislators tend to meet with allied interest 
groups and interest groups tend to give to their legislative allies, a 
correlation between contributions and access may persist even if legislators 
never grant access due to contributions (Grenzke 1989); legislators might 
prefer meeting with their allies even if their allies had not contributed to 
them. In addition, as we discuss at greater length below, if legislators 
attempt to court donations from donors who have not yet given to them, 
comparisons between the treatment donors receive from legislators to whom
they have and have not given may substantially understate the impacts of 
contributions. Perhaps reflecting these challenges, efforts to empirically 
assess the effects of contributions on politicians’ behavior are notorious for 
yielding uneven results (for reviews see Persily and Lammie 2004, fn. 53; 
Stratmann 2005).
In this paper, we present a unique field experiment that helps 
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overcome these methodological challenges. Our experiment considers 
whether political organizations can gain superior access to policymakers 
because their members have contributed to campaigns.1 In the experiment, 
a political organization attempted to schedule meetings between 191 
Congressional offices and its members who were active campaign donors in 
their districts. However, the organization randomly assigned whether it 
revealed to Congressional offices that prospective attendees had contributed
to campaigns. When informed prospective attendees were political donors, 
senior policymakers made themselves available considerably more often (p 
< 0.01). Because whether Congressional offices knew the prospective 
attendees were donors was randomly assigned, we can be confident that 
these differences reflect a causal effect of this information on their access 
decisions. These results have significant consequences for our understanding
of how campaign contributions can facilitate political interest groups’ 
prominence in the policymaking process (e.g., Baumgartner 2009; Gilens and
Page 2014).
In the pages that follow, we first discuss why existing research on this 
subject has struggled with endogeneity. We then describe our experimental 
design and how it overcomes these issues. After presenting our results, we 
conclude with a discussion of their significance for ongoing academic and 
1 As we discuss, the question we seek to answer is whether political organizations can gain 
superior access to policymakers because their members have contributed to campaigns. 
However, rather than randomly assigning whether an organization has donors among their 
membership, a thorny task, we instead randomly assigned whether an organization labeled 
their members as donors, which only organizations with donors among their membership 
can do. We discuss the advantages and disadvantages of this approach at greater length 
below.
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public debates.
Campaign Contributions and Access to Policymakers: Theoretical 
Expectations and Empirical Challenges 
To many members of the public, it seems obvious that campaign 
contributions facilitate preferential treatment from lawmakers (Lessig 2011; 
Gilens 2012). Political actors themselves also appear to share this view, as 
their behavior seems consistent with the belief that their contributions 
facilitate access to powerful policymakers (e.g., Fouirnaies and Hall 2014b, 
2014c; Grimmer and Powell 2013; Powell 2012).
The reasons to suspect campaign contributions help political actors 
secure special attention from policymakers are natural enough. First, money 
can buy expensive campaign advertising that increases legislators’ chances 
of re-election (Green and Gerber 2008; Gerber et al. 2011). Legislators 
appear aware that money can affect whether they are re-elected as they 
choose to spend several hours each day raising it (Grim and Siddiqui 2013).2 
It is thus natural to suspect that, when making decisions about whose policy 
concerns to consider, legislators sometimes face tradeoffs between 
satisfying voters and satisfying contributors that they resolve in contributors’
favor (Stratmann 1991). In addition, policymakers may also view 
contributions as a signal of shared ideology, shared concerns, preference 
intensity, or expertise (e.g., Hall et al. 2009). Legislators thus may view 
2 Votes on campaign finance reform proposals also appear to reflect legislators’ own 
understandings of how it will affect their campaigns’ bottom line (Bender 1988).
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individuals or groups who have contributed to them as likelier to provide 
useful information about how they can make good public policy or about who
cares about a policy.
We would add one more class of mechanisms to this list, which helped 
inform our experimental design (although our design does not definitively 
establish it). Existing work has typically considered potential quid pro quo 
relationships between donors and legislators. In this view, campaign 
contributions represent an implicit contract: donors give to legislators with 
the understanding that legislators will grant them access or other favors in 
exchange (see Hall et al. 2009 for review). Quid pro quo arrangements are 
one way donations may affect legislators’ decisions, but they are not the 
only way. Recent Supreme Court decisions have raised a different possibility,
largely neglected in academic literature but intriguing and potentially 
significant: do legislators grant preferential treatment to individuals because 
they have donated to other campaigns? We see several reasons to expect 
that legislators may give special treatment, such as access, to donors to 
other campaigns as well. First, legislators might privilege an individual’s 
concerns to the extent that individual might donate to their campaign, not 
only to the extent that person has already given. If legislators see donations 
to other campaigns as a signal that an individual might give to their own, 
contributions to one legislator may facilitate access to others. Second, 
legislators may not only seek to facilitate donations for their own campaigns;
they may also seek to forestall donations to their opponents’. For example, a
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legislator may work to maintain support from someone who has previously 
contributed to her opponent in order to discourage him from contributing to 
her opponent again. Finally, legislators may likewise view contributions to 
other legislators as signals of their ideology or expertise.
In the case of both quid pro quo and these more indirect mechanisms, 
many explanations for why legislators might privilege contributors’ concerns 
do not turn on legislators’ desire to raise money per se. However, they still 
have troubling implications for political equality insofar as they suggest some
political actors can more easily afford to secure access with policymakers 
than others.
Inspired by these concerns, a large literature has examined the role of 
contributions in shaping legislators’ decisions. Yet, contrary to the 
expectations outlined above, this literature is famously replete with null 
findings and cause for skepticism (e.g., Bronars and Lott 1997; McCarty and 
Rothenberg 1996; Wawro 2001; Wright 1989, 1990; for reviews see Persily 
and Lammie 2004, fn. 53; Stratmann 2005), including on the question of 
whether contributions facilitate access (e.g., Austen-Smith 1995; Langbein 
1986; Chin et al. 2000; Chin 2005). In fact, null findings are more common 
than significant ones in this literature: Ansolabehere et al. (2003)’s survey of 
the empirical literature on campaign finance more generally finds that over 
75% of empirical research is inconclusive or reaches opposite conclusions 
(although see Stratmann 2005).
Despite the abundance of empirical research on how contributions 
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affect legislators’ behavior, nearly all this research shares a common and 
well-recognized shortcoming. Indeed, one of the few points of agreement in 
the empirical literature on campaign finance is that the available evidence is 
insufficient for assessing the impacts of contributions, both in general (e.g., 
Baumgartner et al. 2009; Fox and Rothenberg 2011) and with regards to 
access specifically (Langbein 1986; Austen-Smith 1995). The concern is 
endogeneity.
To appreciate this concern, suppose interest groups choose to 
contribute to politicians who they believe share their preferences in order to 
help them gain re-election and continue advancing their shared priorities. 
Moreover, suppose legislators prefer to meet with interest groups whose 
preferences they share in order to gain useful policy knowledge (Hall and 
Deardorff 2006). Both these propositions seem likely, yet would result in a 
substantial association between campaign contributions and access even if 
contributions do not themselves secure this access. Correlations between 
money and access thus may reflect significant omitted variable bias due to 
shared ideology between contributors and legislators. If legislators tend to 
meet with allied interest groups and interest groups tend to give to their 
legislative allies, a correlation between contributions and access may persist 
even if legislators never grant access due to contributions (Grenzke 1989); 
legislators might prefer meeting with their allies even if their allies had not 
made contributions.
On the other hand, the null observational results found in much of the 
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literature could also mask significant causal effects. Suppose contributors 
tend to give most to legislators whose support is in doubt but that their 
contributions do succeed in plying them to support their cause. Moreover, 
suppose contributors neglect giving to legislators whose support is already 
assured, seeing no reason to squander funds where they are unneeded. In 
this state of affairs, we might observe no or even a negative relationship 
between contributions and legislative outcomes because contributors have 
chosen their levels of contributions on the basis of how unlikely a legislator is
to support their cause otherwise (e.g., Baumgartner et al. 2009).
The possibilities we raised regarding how legislators may react to 
observing an individual has given to other legislators also presents further 
methodological challenges. Suppose a donor can gain access to many 
legislators by showing they are willing to contribute through donations to 
only a few legislators. In this case, comparisons between legislators to whom
a donor gives and does not give may underestimate the full effect of their 
contributions, as legislators who have received no donations (yet) may still 
respond strongly to the possibility of courting (or preventing) future 
donations. Like a police force concluding guns are insignificant enablers of 
robbery by only focusing on cases when guns are fired, scholars run the risk 
of dramatically underestimating the role of money in politics by focusing only
on the money that is spent (Fox and Rothenberg 2011; see also Simon 
1953). To understand whether legislators grant access to those who have 
contributed, the better comparison is thus how legislators treat donors and 
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non-donors, not how individuals who donated are treated by the legislators 
to whom they have and have not contributed.3
In summary, the common weaknesses of existing studies can be 
summarized as their inability to observe the following counterfactual: how 
would the legislators to whom political actors contribute have behaved if 
these actors had not contributed? Because political actors strategically 
choose to which legislators they give, and legislators respond strategically to
this activity, comparisons between legislators to whom political actors do 
and do not contribute may simply reflect other unobserved differences. 
Likewise, the kinds of individuals who tend to give to campaigns may gain 
more access in general for other reasons, such as their other political 
activities or by virtue of influential positions they hold.
In this paper, we present a field experiment that helps address this 
persistent challenge. The experiment considers whether political 
organizations can secure superior access to policymakers because their 
members have given to campaigns (we discuss the precise counterfactual 
we identify more in a moment). As discussed, existing research has difficulty 
answering this question because the legislators to whom interest group 
members contribute and do not contribute – and which interest groups have 
members that do and do not contribute – are likely to attain differing levels 
of access to policymakers for other reasons as well. In the experiment, 
however, we randomly assigned whether legislators were made aware that a
3 Readers may recognize this logic as that illustrating how SUTVA violations can bias 
estimated effects toward zero (Aronow and Samii 2013).
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political organization’s members had contributed and compared the level of 
access its members obtained when this information was and was not 
revealed. This random assignment ensures that other factors that may lead 
policymakers to grant access to certain groups and not others are held 
constant by design. In the next section we describe the experiment in 
greater detail.
Experimental Design
The experiment considers whether a political organization can obtain 
superior access to policymakers because its members have contributed to 
campaigns. Previous natural experimental research suggests that organized 
groups believe such contributions help secure access (Grimmer and Powell 
2013; Fouirnaies and Hall 2014a, 2014b, 2014c; Powell 2012). Here, we 
provide one of the starkest tests to date of whether such contributions 
actually do secure superior access.
In the experiment, an access-seeking political organization attempted 
to arrange meetings between high-level Congressional officials and its 
members residing in their districts who had previously given to political 
campaigns. However, the organization randomly assigned whether it 
revealed that the prospective attendees were political donors. Randomly 
assigning whether Congressional offices were aware the prospective meeting
attendees were campaign donors helps us shed light on what would have 
occurred if we had randomly assigned whether these individuals actually 
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contributed, but without the potential logistical and legal challenges of doing 
so (Ludwig et al. 2011).4
In contrast to existing research, this field experimental approach 
allows us to draw rigorous causal conclusions about political actors’ real-
world behavior (Findley et al. 2013; Grose 2014). This research design also 
allows us to overcome longstanding concerns that associations between 
political actors’ contributions and policymakers’ behavior are driven by 
political actors’ propensity to give to existing allies and do not reflect 
policymakers’ greater attention to them because they have donated.
Context and Population
The experiment was embedded in a political organization’s effort to 
build support for a bill before Congress to ban a chemical. The organization, 
CREDO Action, is a US liberal political organization with around 3.5 million 
members. It attempts to arrange meetings between its members and their 
legislators from time to time, although prior to the experiment had never 
discussed their members’ donation history in these invitations.
The sample for the experiment included every United States 
Representative of one political party who had not already cosponsored the 
bill, 191 representatives in all.5
4 As with other “mechanism experiments” (see Ludwig et al. 2011 for a definition), there are 
other mechanisms for the effect we uncover that do not reflect one of the broader 
theoretical issues at stake. For example, Congressional offices could have seen the act of 
revealing an individuals’ donor status as a signal that the group itself cared more about the 
issue rather than have been reacting to the information that the individuals were donors 
itself. With this said, our results still have similar implications for political equality 
regardless, as groups that do not have many donors among their memberships cannot 
employ this efficacious strategy.
5 While meeting invitations were being sent to legislators and well in advance of any 
outcome measures being collected, an employee accidentally emailed one of the legislators 
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For the experiment, in each of these 191 Congressional districts, the 
organization first secured agreement from around a dozen organization 
members who had previously donated to political campaigns to attend a 
meeting with their Members of Congress’ office. Members of the political 
organization who had donated were recruited via email and informed that 
their previous contributions might be revealed to their Members of Congress’
office when the meetings were requested.
Random Assignment
Before the organization attempted to arrange the meetings between 
these campaign donors and their Member of Congress’ offices, the offices 
were randomly assigned to one of two experimental conditions, a 
Constituent condition and a Revealed Donor condition.
First, to maximize the limited statistical power inherent in a study of 
members of the finitely-sized United States House of Representatives, 
legislators were blocked into triplets with the other legislators who were 
most similar to them on the following covariates: a score of environmental 
voting compiled by a third party (ProgressivePunch 2013), whether the 
legislator cosponsored the same bill in a previous Congress, the number of 
years the legislator had served in Congress, the legislator’s ideology (Clinton 
et al. 2004; Jackman 2013), the number of members of the political 
(in the Constituent condition) a meeting request addressed to a different Member of 
Congress (also in the Constituent condition). A third staffer not knowledgeable about the 
treatment condition of this legislator decided that this legislator would be removed from the 
study and a follow-up e-mail was sent to this legislator immediately apologizing for sending 
the request to the wrong office and asking them to discard the request. This reduced the 
sample size from 192 to 191 legislators.
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organization that resided within 40 miles of the district office where the 
meeting would be held, and Barack Obama’s share of the 2012 two-party 
presidential vote in the district.6 Legislative offices were allocated to these 
blocks using blockTools in R, which seeks to construct the blocking scheme 
that minimizes the differences between observations within each block as 
determined by the Mahalanobis distance (Moore and Schnakenberg 2013).
Legislative offices were then randomly assigned to treatment 
conditions within each of these 64 blocks, with one office in each block being
randomly assigned to the Revealed Donor condition while the other two 
offices were assigned to the Constituent condition. Treatment offices were 
selected by block by assigning each observation a random number with 
Stata 12’s runiform() function and selecting the office in each block with the 
lowest random number for the treatment group.
Table S2 in the Supplementary Materials presents randomization 
checks and reports the expected covariate balance across the treatment 
conditions. As expected by random assignment, offices in the Revealed 
Donor condition were similar on values of all covariates to offices in the 
Constituent condition. An omnibus test for the existence of differences on 
these covariates was insignificant, as expected (p=0.92, x2=1.44, 5 d.f.).
Implementation Procedure
After the random assignment of the 191 offices to the Constituent and 
6 Note that using covariates to conduct blocking does not affect estimation directly and the 
covariates need not be measured without error in order to improve statistical efficiency; 
using covariates to conduct block random assignment ex ante merely increases statistical 
power to the extent the covariates ultimately prove prognostic of outcomes (Gerber and 
Green 2012).
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Revealed Donor conditions was completed, the organization next sent the 
scheduler7 in every Congressional office a meeting request via email, the 
typical medium by which this group attempts to arrange meetings between 
its members and policymakers. Schedulers’ email addresses were obtained 
from the National Journal’s Almanac of American Politics. If a scheduler could
not be identified in the Almanac, the organization found the scheduler’s 
name using LegiStorm. If more than one scheduler was identified, such as a 
scheduler in the district and one in D.C., both were emailed at once. If a 
scheduler did not appear in either source, the organization collected the 
email address of the staffer most likely to have the duties of a scheduler 
(e.g., office manager, personal assistant, or district manager). In the emails, 
the organization requested a meeting in the congressperson’s district office 
listed in the Almanac. If multiple offices were listed, the organization chose 
the office with the greatest number of staffers.
For offices randomized to the Constituent condition, the meeting 
request described the prospective attendees as “local constituents,” making 
no reference to their contribution history. However, in the Revealed Donor 
condition, the request revealed that the attendees were “local campaign 
donors.” Except for revealing that the prospective attendees were “local 
campaign donors,” no other details about the meeting requests were 
changed. The email sent to legislators, is shown below, with the text in bold 
being assigned based on the legislators’ experimental condition (this text 
7 It is the job of Congressional schedulers to “make recommendations on proposed 
meetings” (Petersen 2010, p. 12).
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was not bolded in the actual emails):
SUBJECT:  Meeting  with  local  [campaign
donors/constituents]  about  cosponsoring  bill  to  [BILL
DETAILS]?
BODY: 
Hi [SCHEDULER],
My name is [EMPLOYEE] and I am an Organizer with CREDO
Action. 
Around a dozen of our members near [DISTRICT CITY] who
are  [active  political  donors/concerned constituents]
have expressed interest in meeting with the Congressman,
in person or by phone from the [CITY] office. 
These  [donors/members]  are  extremely  concerned  by
[DETAILS ON BILL] and would like to tell the Congressman
why  his  base  would  like  him  to  cosponsor  H.R.  [BILL
DETAILS]. This legislation would [DETAILS ON BILL]. They
very much hope that the Congressman will cosponsor the
bill.
If the Congressman is not available, they’d like to arrange
a  meeting  with  the  chief  of  staff,  LA,  or  local  district
director, in person or by phone from your office.
Could we arrange such a call on [DATES]? Our members
are looking for just 30 minutes to have their concerns and
ideas heard. 
Looking forward to hearing from you on what time might
work well and who our members can expect to meet with. 
Thanks in advance,
[EMPLOYEE]
Note that neither version of the invitation suggested that the 
prospective attendees had given to the particular legislator in question; 
rather, the invitation simply revealed that they had contributed to campaigns
in the past in general. This choice allowed the appearance of a quid pro quo 
arrangement to be avoided, although Congressional staff may have 
interpreted the message as indicating that group members had given to this 
legislator. (Moreover, in neither condition did the organization supply the 
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names or contribution histories of the attendees in advance of the meeting.) 
In this sense, this treatment is more subtle than many other ways 
contributions may influence policymakers. The manipulation here consisted 
of changing only a few words in an emailed meeting request. By contrast, 
large campaign donors often tender generous checks directly to legislators 
and form personal relationships in the process. Any preferential treatment 
these kinds of interaction help facilitate seems unlikely to be smaller than 
that garnered by the manipulation we consider here.8
Protocol for Communicating with Congressional Offices
Successfully holding the meetings required several communications 
with Congressional offices. For example, organization staffers often needed 
to obtain information about the physical location of the office and security 
procedures for entry, answer questions about the number of attendees 
expected so a room of proper size could be reserved, etc. As the 
organization employees could not be fully blind to the treatment condition of 
each office given the differing subject lines of the email exchanges with 
schedulers, these interactions potentially represented an opportunity for 
organization employees to introduce bias by communicating to the 
treatment offices in a different manner. To guard against this possibility, 
organization employees carefully followed a detailed protocol when 
communicating with Congressional offices to ensure no differences in their 
8 Describing the attendees as campaign donors in general instead of to the particular 
legislator in question also allows the results to speak to one of the questions raised by the 
Supreme Court in the Citizens United decision – namely, whether lawmakers would grant 
preferential treatment because an individual or a group had donated in general, even in the 
absence of a quid pro quo arrangement (which, to be clear, was not present here).
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interactions with the offices apart from the randomly assigned treatment. 
The organization thus pre-specified and standardized their responses to 
follow-up inquiries prior to sending any invitations so as to ensure all 
correspondence would be identical with the offices regardless of treatment 
condition. In the rare event that the organization received an email that 
required a response that had not been pre-specified, the situation was 
described to a different employee blind to that office’s experimental 
condition who composed the response and added it to the list of standard 
responses. Table S1 in the Supporting Information lists all the responses 
verbatim.
For example, if the organization did not receive a reply within three 
business days, the organization sent the below follow-up email as a reply to 
the original email on the morning of the fourth day.
Hi [SCHEDULER],
My name is [EMPLOYEE] and I am an Organizer with CREDO
Action. I am following up on this meeting request I sent you
last week.
We’re attempting to hold these meetings on [BILL] with 
Members of Congress from across the country. Please let 
me know if we could schedule this meeting. We are hoping 
for sometime around noon on [DATES].
Thanks, and hope to hear from you soon.
Best,
[EMPLOYEE]
See Table S1 in the Supporting Information for the other pre-written 
replies.
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The organization did not further pursue the meeting after two request 
emails were sent. If the scheduler offered scheduling for a date the 
organization did not originally request, the organization reiterated their 
request to hold the meeting on the originally specified dates.
If a meeting was scheduled, the organization invited the members of 
the sponsoring political organization who self-identified as political donors 
and lived near the congressperson’s district office. The organization provided
talking points to the meeting attendees and called or emailed every 
attendee to answer questions about the meeting logistics or talking points.
A team of organization employees implemented this procedure in June,
July, and August of 2013, identifying organization members who had 
previously donated to campaigns, recruiting them for the meetings, 
contacting Congressional offices, arranging meeting details, preparing 
information about the bill at hand for the attendees, and ensuring the 
meetings went smoothly.
An advantage of this experimental design is that it does not present 
many of the ethical concerns that often arise with field experiments on elites
(Grose 2014). Although legislators and meeting attendees were not aware of 
the experiment itself, no deception was involved: all the attendees were 
previous donors and all the meetings were real, a part of the organization’s 
efforts to build support for a bill before Congress. Attendees were aware 
when they agreed to attend the meetings that the fact they had donated 
may be disclosed to their legislators. And, finally, the requests did not ask 
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legislators to engage in any illegal behavior; the requests merely noted that 
the attendees were campaign donors.
The Benefits of Random Assignment
Random assignment of Congressional offices to experimental 
conditions ensures that significant differences in the access they provided 
across the Constituent and Revealed Donor conditions can only be attributed
to the randomly assigned treatment: whether Congressional officials were 
informed that meeting attendees were campaign donors. Existing studies 
establishing associations between donations and legislators’ behavior have 
consistently had difficulty ruling out the hypothesis that legislators do not 
alter their behavior to favor donors but that interest groups merely give 
more to legislators whose choices they support (Baumgartner et al. 2009; 
Grenzke 1989; Hall and Wayman 1990). By contrast, our experimental 
design is capable of assessing the causal effect of revealing that members of
an interest group have donated on legislators’ access decisions, without the 
need to control for factors that lead certain interest groups or their members
to donate.9
Random assignment also holds constant across conditions other 
factors that may lead some Congressional offices to grant greater access 
regardless, such as chance unavailability of certain officials during the study 
9 Random assignment of the knowledge that the prospective meeting attendees had 
donated also potentially allows us to uncover an effect of contributions that previous studies
may have missed. In particular, contributors may also gain access to legislators simply by 
virtue of being donors in general. Legislators to whom a donor has given and not given 
might both be more likely to meet with a donor – for example, one legislator may hope to 
secure a first donation, and the other my hope to secure a second. Comparisons between 
legislators to whom a donor gives and does not give may thus understate the total effects of
the contributions.
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period.
Outcome Measurement and Ex Ante Ranking of Access Quality
In all cases, Congressional offices specified more than 24 hours in 
advance which representative from the office would be attending the 
meeting and this was recorded as the outcome variable of the experiment. 
After the meeting, the organization contacted the attendees to confirm that 
the meeting occurred and that the promised staffer attended. This was 
confirmed in all cases.
To test our hypothesis concerning legislative access, prior to 
examining any results from the experiment, we developed a scheme to rank 
Congressional officials in order of seniority and influence. This ranking 
mirrored the group’s request itself, which noted the attendees’ desire to 
meet with the most senior officials available (see Supplementary Materials):
1. Member of Congress (most desirable outcome)
2. Chief of Staff [most senior staffer in Congressional offices]
3. Legislative Director or Deputy Chief of Staff [second most senior 
staffers in Congressional offices]
4. Legislative Assistant or District Director [policy-focused staffers, but 
less senior than above]
5. Other District-Based Staffer, e.g., Constituent Services Representative 
[these staffers rarely have policy responsibilities]
6. No Meeting (least desirable outcome)
Prior to examining results, two coders blind to treatment assignment 
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categorized each Congressional office into the above categories according to
whether a meeting was scheduled and who attended. Initial disagreements 
about how to code staffers in two offices were easily resolved. If the office 
did not respond within three weeks of the initial request, the office was 
coded as declining the meeting.10
Results
Overall and irrespective of the experimental condition, about half of 
the congressional offices granted meetings in response to the request. We 
expected that many offices would not grant meetings at all given the 
substantial time constraints faced by Members of Congress and their staff 
(Fitch and Goldschmidt 2005, Goldschmidt 2011). Moreover, in order to 
minimize the risk of deviations from the experimental protocol, the protocol 
was designed to limit the number of interactions between organization 
staffers and Congressional offices. For example, if the organization had made
telephone calls to schedulers when requesting the meetings or made an 
appearance in Congressional offices to do so, it is likely that more meetings 
would have been secured. However, these additional interactions would also 
have presented the opportunity for staffers to deviate from the experimental
protocol. Confining the requests to two e-mails ensured that interactions with
offices in each condition could be kept entirely similar except for the 
randomly assigned treatment.
10 This decision rule was set in advance of the experiment.
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Descriptive statistics for the share of offices that provided access to 
officials at each level are presented numerically in Table 1 and graphically in 
Figure 1. The first two columns of Table 1 record how often offices in the 
Revealed Donor Condition and Constituent Condition made officials available 
for meetings. The next two columns show the cumulative probability that 
offices in each condition made officials available at or above each rank. We 
discuss the calculation of p-values below.
Table 1 shows that senior policymakers attended the meetings 
considerably more frequently when Congressional offices were informed that
the meeting attendees were donors. Only 2.4% of offices arranged meetings 
with a Member of Congress or Chief of Staff when they were told the 
attendees were merely constituents, but 12.5% did so when the attendees 
were revealed to be donors. In addition, 18.8% of the groups revealed to be 
donors met with any senior staffer, while only 5.5% of the groups described 
as constituents gained access to a senior staffer, a more than three-fold 
increase.11 56.7% of the offices in the Constituent Condition scheduled any 
meeting compared to 51.6% in the Revealed Donor condition.
11 As discussed, out of concern for designing an experimental protocol that staffers could 
reliably follow, the organization’s campaign for this bill was much less forceful and elaborate
than it might have been had it been only interested in securing cosponsors. Perhaps as a 
result, the number of additional cosponsors the bill received was very low: only 9 legislators 
cosponsored the bill during the study period, and the same share in the treatment and 
control groups. Because the baseline is so low, however, this estimate is associated with 
such considerable uncertainty that it says little about the effect of access on cosponorships. 
Moreover, as several Congressional offices who never replied to the meeting requests at all 
ultimately did cosponsor the bill, it is likely that many of these cosponsorships would have 
occurred anyway and were not due to the meetings. (There was also never a vote held on 
this bill.) These results thus tell us little about the effects of contributions on legislative 
outcomes per se. Efforts to affect legislators’ behavior more forcefully would provide a 
fruitful focus for future experiments (e.g., Bergan 2009). 
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[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE]
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE]
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE]
Figure 2 helps appreciate the magnitude of these differences in 
percentage terms. The Figure displays the percentage increase in access 
offices in the Revealed Donor Condition granted relative to offices in the 
Constituent Condition. These percentages can also be obtained by 
comparing the fourth column of Table 1 to the third. Members of Congress 
were more than three times as likely to meet with individuals when their 
offices were informed the attendees 
were donors, an over 200% increase in access. Putative donors were likewise
more than 400% as likely to meet with either a Member of Congress or a 
Chief of Staff. Strikingly, nearly all the meetings with Chiefs of Staff and 
Members of Congress occurred in the Revealed Donor condition. When 
Congressional offices were only informed that the attendees were their 
constituents, attendees very rarely gained access to officials at this level. 
Offices in the Revealed Donor Condition were also 200% more likely to make 
any senior officials available for the meetings. Although these percentage 
differences are associated with considerable uncertainty, they help illustrate 
that, despite the low baseline level of access to the most senior staffers, the 
treatment effect of revealing the attendees had contributed was 
considerable.
To assess how likely these differences in access would have arisen by 
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chance, each row in the final column of Table 1 displays the exact p-value 
(obtained using randomization inference, a procedure that yields exact p-
values for experiments even in small samples [Fisher 1935, Pitman 1937, 
Keele et al. 2012]) that differences as large as the observed differences 
would have been observed if informing the offices that the attendees were 
donors did not influence access decisions. Randomization inference 
calculates p-values under the sharp null hypothesis of no treatment effect for
all observations. This procedure first assumes the sharp null hypothesis: that
the observed outcome for the Revealed Donor condition would have been 
the same had each office been assigned to the Constituent condition instead,
and vice-versa. Assuming this sharp null hypothesis allows us to compute a 
complete schedule of potential outcomes, from which we can simulate 
randomizations under the blocked assignment procedure to estimate the 
sampling distribution under the sharp null hypothesis of no effect. We then 
calculate a p-value by calculating the probability of obtaining an average 
treatment effect as large as the one observed in the experiment at each 
level of access that is granted. The code for this procedure is given in the 
Supplementary Materials and available in the replication materials.
It is highly unlikely that the greater number of meetings arranged with 
officials at the rank of Chief of Staff and above or Legislative Director and 
above would have occurred in the Revealed Donor condition by chance (ps <
0.01). These differences are statistically significant even when accounting for
strict multiple testing using a Bonferroni correction with a significance level 
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of 0.05 (because we conduct 5 comparisons and these are significant at the 
0.01 level).12 It is also unlikely that Members of Congress themselves would 
have met with groups in the Revealed Donor condition more often by chance
(p = 0.07).
As an alternative way to analyze our data and address the potential for
multiple testing bias, an ordered probit tested the overall hypothesis that 
revealing the attendees were donors caused offices to arrange meetings with
more senior officials, with exact p-values again obtained using randomization
inference (see Supplementary Materials for details). This test yielded a p-
value of 0.05, indicating a low probability that offices in the Revealed Donor 
condition would have provided attendees the superior access they did if 
knowledge that the attendees had donated did not affect the level of access 
they granted.
Discussion
The causal effects of campaign contributions on legislators’ behavior 
have famously evaded rigorous quantification. The public and contributors 
themselves appear to believe that contributions facilitate special access to 
lawmakers, yet a clear demonstration that lawmakers provide such special 
access has been elusive.
Existing literature has struggled to identify the causal effects of 
contributions because it has had difficulty ruling out the possibility that 
12 Because these tests are correlated, this conservative correction overstates our 
uncertainty. We nevertheless present this very conservative correction because it makes 
extremely minimal assumptions and demonstrates the robustness of our results.
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policymakers tend to grant access to contributors merely because 
contributors give to legislators whose actions they support (e.g., Langbein 
1986). Our experiment helps overcome these notorious barriers to inference 
and clearly documented policymakers granting preferential access to 
interest group members because they have contributed to campaigns. When
a political organization randomly assigned some Congressional offices to be 
informed that its members seeking a meeting were donors, the group had 
much greater success securing meetings with senior policymakers.
These results shed new light on how contributions can help organized 
interest groups obtain access to influential policymakers. By virtue of having 
members who had given to political campaigns, the organization in this 
study was able to obtain far superior access to influential policymakers. But 
not all organizations or individuals can be described as campaign 
contributors, as many Americans cannot afford to contribute to campaigns. 
The difference between how Congressional offices reacted to the meeting 
requests when they were and were not aware that organization members 
have donated thus provide a window into the reception organized groups 
that contribute to campaigns receive in Washington, shedding light on how 
they succeed in influencing politics (e.g., Gilens and Page 2014) and 
suggesting troubling implications for political equality.
With regard to the implications of our experiment for how policymakers
interact with the broader constellation of interest groups vying for their 
attention, we find it particularly striking that we detected significant 
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differences in how Congressional offices behaved across the experimental 
conditions in this experiment because the manipulation was extraordinarily 
subtle. It consisted of merely replacing the phrase “local constituents” with 
“local campaign donors” in two locations in a meeting request. By contrast, 
representatives of interest groups and wealthy donors often tender generous
checks directly to legislators. The differences uncovered here seem unlikely 
to be smaller in such situations.
We hasten to note several limitations of our study. First, one 
experiment cannot definitively establish why senior officials more readily 
avail themselves to individuals because they have donated (Bullock et al. 
2010). The experiment was designed to capture multiple reasons why 
legislators might attend to a request because those associated with it had 
donated and suggests future work should take a broad view of the ways 
donations may affect legislators’ behavior. However, this design left open 
questions regarding mechanisms. Legislators may anticipate that meeting 
with donors increases their likelihood of donating to them, but legislators 
may also expect donors to have greater policy expertise than constituents, 
to have stronger preferences on the issues at hand, or be more prognostic of
other party activists’ preferences. Different mechanisms imply different 
policy remedies and different legal implications, so we would welcome 
further research on the matter. On the other hand, that groups who have 
campaign donors among their membership can gain access to policymakers 
that their counterparts without campaign donors cannot has the same social 
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consequences regardless of why this inequity arises. Nevertheless, the 
question of mechanisms is ripe for future research.
Our research also leaves open the relative importance of contributions.
In our experiment, Congressional offices always were informed the potential 
attendees were constituents, so we could not ascertain the relative 
importance of being a constituent and being a contributor (e.g., Chin et al. 
2000; Chin 2005). Future research that considered both elements would help
paint a fuller picture of the scope of contributor influence.
This experiment also invites replication with other politicians, actors, 
and groups. We see little reason to expect legislators would be sensitive to 
knowledge that members of a grassroots liberal organization give to 
campaigns but not to knowledge that corporate executives do so; in fact, to 
the extent concerns about raising money were at play, the effects seem 
likely to be larger for organizations whose members are wealthy. However, 
successful replications in other contexts would no doubt further strengthen 
the credibility of the findings.
Our findings also leave open the question of whether or not increased 
access translates into tangible influence. Certainly, professional lobbyists 
behave as though access to legislators is an important condition for 
influencing policy (e.g., Hansen 1991), and reformers have focused on 
disparities in access in part because the view that access facilitates influence
is so widely accepted. However, future work should build on the present 
research and examine whether the increased access contributions appear to 
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enable can be used to secure policy outcomes.
In closing, we return to the implications of our findings for political 
equality. In recent years, scholars have become increasingly concerned with 
the ways rising economic inequality may translate into political inequality 
(e.g., Bartels 2009). The hypothesis that political actors and organized 
interest groups can command influential policymakers’ attention by 
contributing to campaigns has been among the most contested explanations 
for how financial resources translate into political power (Gilens 2012; Gilens 
and Page 2014; Hacker and Pierson 2010; Hall and Wayman 1990; Lessig 
2011). The simple but revealing experiment presented here elevates this 
hypothesis from extensively contested to experimentally supported: many of
the organization members who wanted to express their concerns to senior 
policymakers in our experiment would not have been able to do so if 
policymakers had not been informed that they had donated. Our results thus 
suggest that the vast majority of Americans who cannot afford to contribute 
to campaigns in meaningful amounts are at a disadvantage when attempting
to express their concerns to policymakers.
The disadvantage groups who represent most Americans appear to 
face when it comes to gaining access to policymakers is crucial. Access to 
powerful officials is often necessary for influencing policy, even if it is not 
sufficient (Hansen 1991): in order to articulate one’s concerns to legislators, 
one needs their attention first (Lewis et al. 1998; Hasen 2012; Wright 1990; 
Hall and Wayman 1990). Access also appears to bring concerns to the top of 
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legislators’ minds (Miler 2009, 2010). Yet legislators and senior officials have 
limited time and attention, so when they spend time hearing the concerns of 
some groups who ask to meet with them, they necessarily devote less to 
others’ (Hall 1996; Hall and Deardorff 2006). And there is good reason to 
believe that contributors’ concerns are systematically different. Few 
Americans can afford to contribute to campaigns, while those who can afford 
to do so have markedly different preferences and priorities than the broader 
public (Page et al. 2013; Page and Seawright 2014). To the extent that who 
policymakers hear from is determined by who can afford to donate, 
policymakers’ worldviews may be significantly distorted in ways that benefit 
the wealthy (Lessig 2011; Hall and Deardorf 2006).
These findings have particular importance in light of recent Supreme 
Court decisions striking down significant campaign finance regulations, such 
as Citizens United and McCutcheon v. FEC. Assuming the Court does not 
revisit its decisions in these cases, our findings raise concerns about their 
implications for political equality. Those who seek to influence policy value 
access so highly because it allows them to make arguments and requests to 
powerful decision-makers (Hansen 1991). Our experiment suggests that 
campaign finance rules allow those who can afford to donate to political 
campaigns a special advantage to obtain this coveted opportunity. By 
allowing significantly more spending in American elections, the Court’s 
recent decisions have the potential to worsen this disparity.
Schattschneider (1960) famously noted that those who tend to 
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participate in politics are more likely to speak with an “upper class accent.” 
Our findings provide some of the clearest evidence to date that the American
campaign finance system helps amplify their voices.
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Table 1. Results: Access Gained in Constituent and Revealed Donor 
Conditions
Level of
Official
Group Met
Constitue
nt
Condition
Frequency
Revealed
Donor
Condition
Frequenc
y
Constituent
Condition
Cumulative
Probability
Revealed
Donor
Condition
Cumulative
Probability
p-value:
Revealed
Donors
more likely
to gain
access at
or above
this rank
Member of
Congress
2.4% 7.8% 2.4% 7.8% p = 0.07
Chief of
Staff
0.0% 4.7% 2.4% 12.5% p = 0.006
Legislative
Director or
Deputy
Chief of
Staff
3.1% 6.2% 5.5% 18.8% p = 0.005
DC-Based
Legislative
Assistant or
Local
District
Director
25.2% 18.8% 30.7% 37.5% p = 0.17
Other
District-
Based
Staffer
12.6% 10.9% 43.3% 48.4% p = 0.26
No Meeting 56.7% 51.6% 100% 100% -
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Figure 1. Access Gained to Congressional Staffers, By Experimental 
Condition
44
Figure 2. Percentage Increase in Access Revealed Donors Gained, At
Or Above Each Level
Notes: Each bar shows the percent increase in the share of meetings that 
occurred at or above each level in the Revealed Donor condition relative to 
the Constituent condition. These can be obtained by comparing the fourth 
column of Table 1 to the third.
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